India on the Horns of a Dilemma
Praful Bidwai
NEW
DELHI: As the United States steps up its bellicose anti-Iraq rhetoric
and prepares to move the United Nations to stir up the issue of
combating the ”terrorist” regime of Saddam Hussein,
the Indian government finds itself locked in the horns of a dilemma.
Should
it support a ”pre-emptive” attack against Iraq as part
of US President George W Bush's 'global war against terrorism',
which it zealously and unconditionally welcomed a year ago? Or should
it maintain a distance from anti-Iraq military and diplomatic moves
and pursue a
relatively independent course?
On
the one hand, New Delhi has good relations with Baghdad. Traditionally,
it has been one of the biggest buyers of Iraqi oil. On the other,
it also fervently seeks a ”strategic partnership” with
the United States, one that it sees as crucial to advancing its
interests in South
Asia that include isolating its rival Pakistan.
Complicating
the choice are two other factors. Iraq is one of the few countries
of the world to support India's stand on Kashmir.
But
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee is also under pressure
from domestic right-wing lobbies to overcome what they describe
as ”stagnation” in Indo-US relations, by enthusiastically
supporting America's new strategic doctrine of ”pre-emption”.
How the government resolves the dilemma remains clouded in confusion.
But it is abundantly clear that its dilemma will become increasingly
acute if the United States moves toward extending the ”anti-terror”
war to Iraq and overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Dealing
with the ”threat” posed by Iraq is the only foreign
or strategic policy issue on which the Vajpayee government and the
US Republican administration -- both conservative in orientation
-- have differed significantly ever since Bush came to power.
Otherwise, New Delhi has strongly supported some of Bush's most
aggressively unilateralist moves, especially those targeting arms
control agreements on weapons of mass destruction. Such support
militates against India's own long-standing positions.
For
instance, India was the first state in the world, not excluding
America's most loyal European allies, to welcome Bush's May 2001
speech announcing 'Star Wars' or ballistic missile defence (BMD)
plans -- which New Delhi had opposed for a quarter-century.
Once
a non-aligned country, India also found itself on the same side
as the United States in opposing the landmines ban treaty and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which the United States signed, unlike
India, but has refused to ratify). Both governments oppose tooth
and nail
the creation of the International Criminal Court.
India's
policy shift away from non-alignment into the US camp is explained
by four factors.
These
are the policy disorientation after the Soviet Union's collapse,
rightward shifts in Indian society and politics with the rise to
power of the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India's attempt
to ”normalise” itself after the opprobrium it attracted
with the May 1998 nuclear tests, and the BJP's very special pro-American
orientation.
This
leaning has been reinforced by the party's uncritical support for
corporate globalisation abroad and for neoliberal policies domestically.
Indian
leaders had hoped that the new ”strategic partnership”
between the New Delhi and Washington -- two ”natural allies”
and great ”democracies” -- would politically marginalise
Pakistan. After the May 1998 nuclear tests, Islamabad faced aid
withdrawal, capital flight and economic near-collapse.
This
would greatly help India end ”cross-border terrorism”
-- violence by militant groups, supported and armed by Islamabad,
especially in disputed Kashmir.
Then
came Sep. 11. Pakistan under President Gen Pervez Musharraf made
a quick U-turn on its Afghanistan policy, ditched its creation,
the Taliban, and became the US critical ally in the war to dislodge
the al-Qaeda-Taliban regime.
This
caused much heartburn in New Delhi, which instead advocated an ”alliance
between democracies” to combat ”terrorism”.
It
has since made the most of being the biggest victim of ”terrorism”
and tried to win US support in fighting Pakistan. In December, it
launched a huge mobilisation at the Pakistan border with 700,000
troops -- in Rambo-style retaliation for an attack on its Parliament
that it blamed
on Islamabad.
The
United States has expressed verbal sympathy for India's position.
It did not ask Delhi to withdraw troops. It has counselled restraint
-- pulling India and Pakistan back from the brink of a war that
has a distinct potential for nuclear escalation.
The
resentment caused in New Delhi by lack of full-throated US support
is compounded by Washington's reluctance to approve the sale of
critical Israeli weapons to India in spite of its tacit support
for Ariel Sharon's aggressive anti-Palestinian policies, and departure
from its
traditional stance.
The
crisis over Iraq amid this situation has to an extent polarised
Indian policy-makers and shapers.
On
one side are those who would like to return to India's ”traditional”
positions on international relations, with an emphasis on multilateralism
and the primacy of the U.N. Security Council, and opposition to
the use of force as the preferred method of resolving conflict.
They would like New Delhi to distance itself from outright war on
Iraq, or at least be ”non-committal” on it.
On
the other side is the obsequiously pro-US lobby, which wants India
to become America's pro-active ally in anti-Iraq operations.
This
lobby argues that the ”realities of power” dictate that
India should abandon multilateralism and fall in line with the United
States. This lobby is not unanimous in buying the US argument that
Iraq already possesses weapons of mass destruction or is about to
get them. But it is
united in asking that New Delhi declare its support to the ”pre-emption”
doctrine.
This
is the first time that such views have been openly aired, for example,
in the Indian media -- an sign of how the environment has changed
since 1991 when it was hard to find any commentator even vaguely
sympathetic to the US official viewpoint.
The
”multilateralist” view, opposing an attack on Iraq,
may well prevail over the pro-America lobby in the short run at
the level of proclaimed positions in multilateral forums. But if
the United States moves into full-fledged war, then what India does,
or is asked to do, will matter
more.
In
1991, India cautioned against the Gulf War and then temporarily
maintained relative neutrality. But within a few months, it was
prevailed upon to indicate its support for the war by refuelling
US warplanes. The refuelling was not a strategic necessity, but
a political move.
It
seems unlikely that a much more compromised India will be able to
withstand US pressure this time around.
Email Story | 
Discuss Story
