Ambassador
Teresita C. Schaffer
Despite
a summer of political ferment in Kashmir, violence remains high
and the underlying impasse has not changed. Barring some significant
changes in policy in both Islamabad and Delhi, the state elections
scheduled for September/October are unlikely to settle the question
of who can speak for the Kashmiris in negotiating their future with
India and Pakistan. The United States and other outsiders have been
trying to help 
move
this process forward. They have an opportunity to do so, but starting
a successful peace process will require more than a simple decision
to talk.
Inside
the Kashmir Valley: Broadly speaking, there are three main groups
of political actors in the Valley of Kashmir, the heartland of the
Kashmir dispute. The National Conference, under Farooq Abdullah,
runs the state government, and has made its peace with India. One
set of favor Pakistan (and enjoy its support). Another set of militant
groups and political organizations favors independence. Most observers
believe that the separatists are the most numerous; they have in
any case been at the heart of recent efforts to expand Kashmiris'
independent room for maneuver. The best-known political organization
is the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC), an umbrella group
of Valley Muslims embracing 23 political organizations. Most of
its members are separatists, though some favor Pakistan and one,
the Kashmir Bar Association, is non-political. In somewhat similar
manner, the Hizbul Mujahideen, a largely Kashmiri militant movement
that had declared a unilateral ceasefire in June 2000, also has
a strong presence in Pakistan.
In
a rare display of unity, the Hurriyet in February announced that
it wanted to hold its own election, monitored by an independent
"commission" comprising several well-known legal and NGO
personalities. The organization did not claim any legal authority
for the election, but hoped to provide some mechanism (other than
an election sponsored by the Government of India) to show that the
winners had broad popular legitimacy. The idea fizzled, rejected
by India and not embraced by Pakistan, but this proposal and its
failure intensified Kashmiri political activists' search for ways
to oblige the Indian authorities to take them seriously.
The
approaching elections: The regular state government elections are
due in October, and the Indian government has been trying to persuade
Kashmiri dissidents to participate. This is a hard sell. Past elections
have been badly marred by fraud and manipulation. Political dissidents
who participate fear losing credibility with their separatist constituency.
They also fear violence from supporters of the state government,
or from militants, some of them Pakistan-supported. Even without
these problems, their success would by no means be assured. Most
of the APHC leaders, for example, have only a narrow individual
following and no real political experience. By contrast, their opponents
in the National Conference have not only incumbency but also well-developed
networks of patronage and grass-roots politics on their side.
At
this point, the prospects for dissident participation are almost
nil. Shabir Shah, the respected leader of the Jammu and Kashmir
Democratic Freedom party, and some Hurriyet leaders had earlier
said they might consider joining elections if they were the first
step in a peace process, and if the Indian and state authorities
took steps to create a favorable atmosphere, such as releasing jailed
political leaders and strengthening human rights protections. However,
the Indian government has not been interested in taking these steps.
It was also unwilling to consider accrediting foreign election monitors,
a step that might have had an impact. Dissidents who had been thinking
about participation have now ruled it out, and with the election
due to start in late September it is probably too late to reverse
that decision.
Embryonic
dialogue: Meanwhile, a self-appointed Kashmir Committee headed by
a former minister in the Indian government, Ram Jethmalani, may
have made some headway in exploring the basis for a serious negotiation.
Leaders of the Hurriyet, as well as Shabir Shah, were in Delhi in
late August to hold talks with the committee. Unfortunately, the
committee's plea for a postponement of the election to give the
dialogue time to bear fruit has apparently failed. An outspoken
maverick, Jethmalani has persuaded his interlocutors to continue
talking about other ways of starting a process, and this may at
least get some key negotiating issues on the table. However, Jethmalani
does not speak for the Indian government. Kashmir's chief minister,
Farooq Abdullah, is also said to be holding discussions on possible
autonomy schemes, although the Indian Home Ministry has severely
restricted the scope of their conversations. This effort may be
partly designed to improve Abdullah's nationalist credentials; if
so, it is unlikely to work.
High
violence, heavy-handed law and order: Despite these efforts to explore
common ground, Kashmiri activists have been under continued intense
pressure from the Indian and state authorities. Three leaders of
the APHC Executive Committee have been arrested, along with some
40 second tier leaders. Political activists complain of persistent
trouble from the authorities, from denial of permission to hold
political meetings to arbitrary harassment of known activists to
traffic stops designed to oblige people to obtain new "Voter
ID" cards.
The
case of Yasin Malik illustrates the problem. In 1989, he embarked
on a violent campaign, but renounced violence in 1994 and has since
cultivated a near-Gandhian persona. At 35, he is perhaps the member
of the APHC Executive Committee who is best known internationally.
He was arrested in March 2002 under the controversial Prevention
of Terrorism Act on charges most people regarded as flimsy, apparently
beaten in prison, aggravating a number of medical problems for which
he had previously been treated in the United States. The Supreme
Court ordered his release on technical grounds, but Malik was rearrested
the same day under different legislation. There are reports that
he was approached, during a brief stay in the hospital while in
detention, and offered his freedom if he would join the elections;
when he refused, he was returned to jail. The administrative message
is that Kashmiris with an independent political voice can expect
to be harassed and silenced, and that they can only expect to join
the political process under duress. This is hardly an incentive
to join the election process.
Inside
Kashmir, violence is reported daily against Indian army and police
targets, Hindu pilgrims, and ordinary villagers. Another Hurriyet
leader, Abdul Ghani Lone, known both for his bitterness toward India
after years in Indian jails and for his willingness to tell Pakistan
publicly to stop manipulating Kashmiris, was shot dead on May 21
at a memorial ceremony for a Kashmiri religious leader murdered
several years ago. The list of those suspected in this crime runs
from Indian agents to Pakistani agents, and all shades of opinion
in between; many Kashmiris have pointed their fingers at Pakistan.
The
Farooq Abdullah factor: Many people believe that the arrests and
harassment of activists are directly or indirectly the work of Chief
Minister Farooq Abdullah. His father was Kashmir's great political
leader until his death in 1982. His six years at the helm of the
state have been marked by corruption and cronyism. His son Omar,
until recently Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the national
government, has now taken over as head of the party. They have no
interest in encouraging new political figures to enter Kashmiri
elections. While officials in Delhi recognize Farooq Abdullah's
weakness as a popular leader and administrator, the Indian government
thus far has apparently been willing to let him have his way when
it comes to controlling the political environment in the Valley.
The
rest of Jammu and Kashmir: Within the Indian-administered parts
of the state, three other constituencies will figure in any effort
to settle the state's future. Both predominantly Hindu Jammu and
the sparsely populated but mainly Buddhist Ladakh are cool toward
any autonomy proposal that leaves them at the mercy of the Muslims
of the Valley. The Hindu (Pandit) community that has been largely
pushed out of the Valley during the recent troubles is also anxious
to make its voice heard. The Indian government rejects splitting
the state into its component parts based on different religious
majorities, but parts of the ruling party favor an arrangement that
would give Ladakh and Jammu greater autonomy within the state.
Finding
a way forward: This situation leaves Kashmiri political activists
badly divided, with no leader or group that is broadly accepted.
All are vulnerable to manipulation by India, Pakistan, and the National
Conference. Under present circumstances, the election in Kashmir
is unlikely to resolve the one issue that an election ought to settle:
who speaks for the local Kashmiris.
Indian
policy: The Indian government wants to deal with the Kashmiris in
a domestic context, and to hold any talks with Pakistan separately
from and subsequent to discussions with the Kashmiris. It sees the
state election as the first step, but has no effective strategy
to bring in the dissidents, let alone change the relationship of
Delhi to Kashmir enough to reduce the Kashmiris' alienation. Prime
Minister Vajpayee has articulated a vision of a new relationship
with Kashmir and with Pakistan, but Deputy Prime Minister Advani
resists conciliatory gestures as a sign of weakness. India's reluctance
to change policy is reinforced by its conviction that Pakistan would
play a spoiler's role if India launched a dramatic initiative toward
the Kashmiris.
Pakistan:
Formally, the Government of Pakistan still holds to the 1949 U.N.
resolutions and their call for a plebiscite in which Kashmiris can
choose to join either Pakistan or India. However, since early 2001
Pakistani government spokesmen have shifted their emphasis, saying
that Pakistan can accept a settlement that satisfies Kashmiris.
After
Musharraf promised the United States that he would cut off infiltration
across the Line of Control to support the insurgency in Kashmir,
the movement of militants was reduced. But Pakistan's support has
clearly not been terminated, and its political and intelligence
infrastructure remains. Especially in the absence of any Indian
move to start talks on Kashmir, a permanent end to Pakistan's support
for militancy may be more than the Pakistan government is willing
or able to do.
Kashmiri
dissidents are ambivalent about Pakistan's role. Pakistan has not
been eager to see genuine Kashmiri leadership develop or to see
genuine dialogue between the Kashmiris and the government in Delhi,
fearing that Pakistan could be marginalized in the process.
A role
for outsiders? The events of the last year have put India-Pakistan
relations and Kashmir on the international agenda. U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, used recent
trips to the region to try to lay the groundwork for India-Pakistan
talks. Powell also called publicly for steps that would increase
the credibility of the Kashmir state elections, acknowledging the
need for Kashmiris to be involved in an eventual peace process.
To be effective, the United States needs to sustain these diplomatic
efforts and supplement them with a strategy for helping the participants
to begin tacitly constructing a situation that they can live with
over the long term.
The writer is Director, South Asia Program at Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C. She is an expert
in political, economic, security developments and nuclear issues
in South Asia; US trade policy and US relations with the Middle
East. She speaks French, Swedish, German, Italian, Hebrew, Hindi,
Urdu, Bangla, and Sinhala languages. This report was published in
the South Asia Monitor of CSIS on Sept 1, 2002 and is being reprinted
with permission. Copyright CSIS .
http://www.csis.org/saprog/monitor.htm
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