Haven for the Taliban
Editorial, November 2,
2003
THE
PAKISTANI city of Quetta lately has become more than a provincial
capital; it might also be described as the new headquarters of
the extremist Taliban movement, which ruled Afghanistan and sheltered
Osama bin Laden until two years ago.
According to one recent report by the respected Pakistani journalist
Ahmed Rashid, "Thousands of Taliban fighters reside in mosques
and madrassas with the full support of a provincial ruling party
and militant Pakistani groups. Taliban leaders wanted by the U.S.
and Kabul governments are living openly in nearby villages."
Mr. Rashid quoted the provincial government's information minister
as saying, "Only the Taliban can constitute the real government
of Afghanistan."
During a recent visit, The Post's John Lancaster met with a Taliban
recruiter who described how he traveled with 14 other Pakistanis
across the border into Afghanistan last summer to wage war against
U.S. and Afghan government forces. "It's no problem at all
to cross back and forth," the recruiter said.
All this is happening in a country whose government claims to
be an ally of the United States in the war on terrorism and to
which the Bush administration has pledged more than $3 billion
in aid -- the down payment on what it describes as a "long-term
commitment."
The
Taliban leaders and their followers are not ensconced in remote
caves or dispersed across trackless badlands but operate openly
in a major city, where they effectively control several neighborhoods.
Local politicians deliver speeches and raise money on their behalf.
When they travel to Afghanistan to carry out attacks, they cross
not in ones or twos but by the score, in buses that are waved
through by Pakistani border guards. In the past several months
they have killed more than 400 Afghan civilians and soldiers,
along with several U.S. soldiers, in various attacks.
If
Afghanistan now is in danger of slipping back into the chaos of
civil war, the haven and support found by a regrouping Taliban
in Pakistan is a major cause. Yet the Bush administration continues
to shrink from demanding accountability from President Pervez
Musharraf. Last month, just before a visit to Islamabad, Deputy
Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage hinted at an open secret
-- that parts of Gen. Musharraf's army and security forces don't
support the war on terrorism.
But
the army carried out a raid against al Qaeda just before the arrival
of the American delegation, and Mr. Armitage pronounced himself
"thrilled" by his conversation with Mr. Musharraf. "This
is a special relationship to the United States," he said,
"one that President Bush treasures particularly."
The Bush administration seems to believe it has no choice but
to work with Mr. Musharraf, who is good at promising to combat
Islamic extremism -- and at pointing to it as the alternative
should his government fail. In late September the administration
coaxed its client to sign a written agreement promising to strengthen
control over "frontier areas bordering Afghanistan."
That's
a big job, but it's hard to see why Mr. Musharraf can't at least
prevent open Taliban operations in Quetta and other cities. Congress
recently renewed conditions on aid to Pakistan and added a provision
requiring the administration to certify that Pakistan is cooperating
in the war on terrorism. If the United States is to continue supporting
his regime, the general must be held to that requirement.
