American Press
Should Support Pakistani Parliament, Not the Dictator
By
Muhammad-Najm Akbar
THERE ARE SEVERAL signals that the Washington Post editorial
of November 1, 2003 conveyed to the military regime in Islamabad.
The sum total of all that was written or left unsaid could be
summed up in one phrase: You have lost credibility.
Military dictators owe their life firstly to their power-base
and secondly to their relevance to their end-users. From my first-hand
interaction with the American diplomats for over two-decades,
I am positive that they know the tremors in any Pakistani dictator's
power-base before the cracks hit the surface.
It
was funny, therefore, to see my former colleagues in the FO contradicting
the remarks made last month, just before his visit to Islamabad,
by Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage about some distance
between General Musharraf and "parts" of the army and
security forces specifically, as the Washington Post
underscored again, on the issue of the war on terrorism. Click
for Text of Washington Post Editorial
I
am sure many of my American colleagues remember that the first
coup maker in the post-1970 Pakistan had directed the same FO
to affirm at the United Nations General Assembly that elections
will be held in 90 days. Then the coup maker stayed for 11 years.
The FO is not the right place to look into the army's plans. Who
would know better than the office of Mr. Armitage and for that
reason my brilliant ex-colleagues at the FO, that General Musharraf
has lost all ingredients of legitimacy.
Trained
as agents of the most constitutional state in the world, the American
diplomats definitely know what it means when a constitutional
tenure comes to an end. Irrespective of the veracity of the anonymous
letter from the GHQ whose receipt, possession and distribution
has entitled Javed Hashmi to a Mutiny Trial, logically the possibilities
of "Mutiny" might exist elsewhere, with highly powerful
quarters, not with the harmless President of the ARD or a few
other MNAs that the government is chasing now.
In all seniority and hierarchy-based organizations, senior officers
want to reach the summit. If ignored or marginalized, the army
officers are not as helpless as the civilian bureaucrats and politicians
and also clearly understand that none of them is more qualified
than others to hold the privileged and more powerful offices beyond
his specified term. Any Army Chief who grants himself an indefinite
extension commits an unprofessional, illegitimate and unconstitutional
act.
Pakistan
Army's most trusted religious organization, Jamat-i-Islami, has
consistently tried to restrict the entire LFO issue to the Army
Chief's uniform: Take It Off, and the rest is negotiable. The
message is loud and clear: since 7 October 2001, these stars and
the uniform do not belong to you. General Musharraf should listen
to the Jamat before he gets marching orders from somewhere else.
As
cracks have appeared in his power base, General Musharraf has
nowhere else to look for support. "Go Musharraf go"
and "no LFO no" have become the favorite slogans in
Pakistan's Parliament House where in just one session opposition
members in chorus chanted and thumped their desks for about 10
minutes.
The
Washington Post leaves no doubt that General Musharraf
is still relevant to the end-users, for the war on terrorism,
but evidently a disarmed soldier can fight no wars. He has to
give up sooner or later and leave the spot to the veritable commander.
There are standard phrases, which my ex-colleagues and I learnt
to react reflexively to the editorials like that of this Saturday.
The problems is who is more reliable, the regime or Ahmed Rashid?
The dictators lose it one day despite their best efforts. The
regime in Pakistan had contributed enormously to the war in Afghanistan.
At home, it has faced strong resentment against deployment of
troops in the tribal areas and particularly the army operation
in South Waziristan. The tribesmen are protesting against hundreds
of check posts that have been set up in the tribal areas since
the army entered the region for the first time ever last year.
For the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Pukhtunistan issue is back in the news. The MMA would observe
a solidarity day with tribesmen on Nov 7. On October 28, the government
reaffirmed in the National Assembly that the current military
operation in tribal areas would continue. All this means nothing
to the Washington Post. Last month, the New York
Times expressed similar views on the anvil of General Musharraf's
visit to New York. The regime has lost credibility.
What is most regrettable is that the two most influential newspapers
in America fail to make even a passing reference to the need to
form real alliances, with the people, in this case, with the people
of Pakistan. Saddam Hussain or whoever, unrepresentative autocrats
do not last and fail to command respect. For any action against
terrorism to be durable, it has to be supported and complimented
by political process.
The military government in Pakistan has weakened the political
processes. No dialogue with the people can be held without their
true representatives. Terrorism contradicts the ethos of the people
of Pakistan. They need no incentives or quid-pro-quo for their
fundamental belief in the dignity and sanctity of human life.
The
Washington Post and the New York Times must, however,
acknowledge the need for them to have truly representative and
constitutional structures. The people of Pakistan are also entitled
to expression of concern over their political and constitutional
problems.
The
regime has also failed to eliminate sectarian terrorism throughout
the country. The problem is as such is not restricted to Quetta
or some border cities. A deeper and comprehensive action is needed
to address these and several other issues. For all this, it is
high time that the leaders of the American press listen to the
slogans raised in Pakistan's Parliament, sooner than later.
The
writer was till recently a senior Pakistani diplomat
