Why the
New Delhi Establishment is Getting Worried
The Peace Process is Doomed as
Pendulum Swings Again
By
Ajai Sahni
INDIA’S POLICY on Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), on terrorism,
and on Pakistan - has often been criticized for its inconsistencies.
Over the past years, however, an increasing consistency has been
evident - though perhaps not in any particularly constructive
sense: the consistency of a pendulum, swinging with insistent
regularity from one extreme to the other.
This fruitless cycle has been repeated in an endless succession
of 'peace initiatives' at the highest level - regularly interrupted
by escalating violence, military mobilization, coercive diplomacy
and belligerent political rhetoric - certainly since the Prime
Minister's 'Ramadan Ceasefire' (cessation of offensive operations
against terrorists) in November 2000, and indeed, at different
stages before.
The current set of initiatives is one more directionless link
in a chain that is steadily losing credibility, even among those
who watch these processes from a great distance. Thus, the US
Congressional Research Service has already dismissed the current
process as 'moribund', though a delusional Indian media and a
gaggle of 'experts' committed to what has been called, in another
context, the 'political realism of appeasement', continue to wax
eloquent on the 'confidence building measures' announced.
The
current 'peace process', like its predecessors, is doomed to inevitable
failure, in the first instance, because, it does not reflect the
realities of the ground, or any radical shift in the fundamental
positions, either of India or Pakistan.
Thus, any negotiations, within this context, would seek only to
advance the tactical objectives of the engaging parties. The possibilities
of a fundamental and strategic shift in the Pakistani perspective,
and tactical agenda are remote. Pakistan - and the elites that
control power, not just the present regime, in that country -
remains entirely committed to its founding ideology of Islamism
and religious exclusion, and consequently, to undermining the
integrity of the secular, democratic Indian nation state (characteristics
that India would be entirely unwilling to compromise or dilute).
Evidence
of Pakistan's unwavering strategic perspectives - despite broad
tactical variations - can be discovered in relation to recent
events and policies in another theatre: Afghanistan. In the wake
of the 9/11 incidents and US pressure on Pakistan to join the
'global coalition against terror', Pakistan was widely seen to
have performed a U-turn on its Afghan policy, and to have 'abandoned'
its long standing quest for 'strategic depth' through interference
in the internal affairs of that country. Proof of the Pakistani
'U-turn' has been vociferously asserted through a steady dribble
of Al Qaeda cadres handed over to US Forces, though it is far
from clear how much of this trickle is voluntary or coerced.
Nevertheless,
as the American attention wavers, there is mounting evidence that
Pakistan is reviving its earlier policies on Afghanistan, using
various proxies to put the Hamid Karzai regime under pressure,
and offering its 'services' to America to help mobilize forces
- including the remnants of its surrogate, the Taliban, incredibly
being repackaged as a 'moderate Taliban' - that could 'help fill'
the existing power vacuum in the uncontrolled areas beyond Kabul's
sway.
Clearly, while Pakistan has executed dramatic policy shifts to
cope with the exigencies and imperatives arising out of the post-9/11
scenario, its fundamental strategic perspectives remain tied to
the pre-9/11 world, and to the original ideological impulses of
its creation. This fact underpins its responses in J&K, and
with regard to its wider support to terrorism in various theatres
in India as well.
The
most probable assumption, consequently, is that the current 'peace
process' will simply be used by Pakistan as an instrumentality
to focus attention on what it calls the 'core issue' of Kashmir.
As
a result, an extended process of 'negotiations' may be entered
into, but would remain no more than a charade (the obvious mischievousness
of some of Pakistan's 'counter-proposals', indeed, the rather
shrill rhetoric on both sides, seems to suggest that the shared
intent is more theatrical than substantive). Terrorist activities
on Indian soil would, consequently, be sustained; would be calibrated
to the exigencies of both bilateral and international developments;
and would tend to be held at maximal levels at which 'credible
minimal deniability' can be maintained.
Over
the coming weeks, state support by Pakistan to terrorist organizations,
and their visible presence and activities on Pakistani soil, may
temporarily be driven deeper underground; as the 'peace initiative'
is seen to progress, some symbolic - but necessarily ineffectual
- action may again be taken against some of the groups to demonstrate
Pakistan's 'seriousness' in 'tackling terrorism'; but terrorist
activities in J&K and other parts of India would be retained
at the maximum possible within the limits of international tolerance.
Increasingly,
moreover, assertive elements in the Army and the Inter Services
Intelligence, as well as fundamentalist political and extremist
groupings in Pakistan, would tend to promote and consolidate independent
capacities to promote the jehadi agenda; past experience, however,
has demonstrated that Musharraf would, nevertheless, retain control,
since most of the jehadi groups are, in fact, held firmly 'by
the scruff of their necks' by the Army.
Such
groups will also continue to cement alliances with various other
Islamist extremist entities, such as the al Qaeda and the Taliban,
active or present in Pakistan, as well as with the organized criminal
underground. At the stage where Pakistan finds itself losing out
in the propaganda war over the 'peace process', these entities
can be expected to immediately escalate violence to engineer major
terrorist strikes in India at a stage where the blame for a 'breakdown'
can passed on to alleged Indian intransigence.
The
space for covert sponsorship of terrorism in South Asia - by both
state and non-state entities - is seen to have substantially expanded
after a temporary post-9/11 contraction, particularly since the
beginning of the US campaign in Iraq, and increasingly since the
apparently mismanaged 'peace' there.
The
future of terrorism in South Asia is integrally linked to the
stabilization of both Afghanistan and Iraq, and perceptions of
US vulnerabilities in these theatres will encourage traditional
sponsors of terrorism in South Asia to escalate terrorist campaigns,
not only against rivals within the region, but increasingly against
US and Western interests as well.
The continuous succession of strikes against US Forces in Iraq;
the growing disorders in Afghanistan; the rising and manifest
consternation in the US regarding the increasing toll in American
lives; and the growing significance of events in Iraq in US domestic
politics and President Bush's re-election prospects next year,
are all creating complex incentives for an escalation in terror
across the world.
The
ideologues and campaign managers of Islamist extremism are becoming
convinced that the world's sole superpower - though it cannot
be confronted directly in conventional conflict - is nevertheless
vulnerable to the 'war of the flea'.
The
destruction of the capacities and infrastructure of terrorism,
consequently, now becomes the most urgent imperative of the global
war against terrorism. Unfortunately, there is little evidence
of significant diminution in these, despite the steady stream
of 'victories' chalked up through the arrest or neutralization
of individual terrorists.
The writer is Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
