Ceasefire
Will Not Hold, With Same Game, New Rules
By
Syed Saleem Shahzad
KARACHI
- A ceasefire between Pakistan and India along three of their
borders went into effect at midnight on Tuesday. The million-dollar
question everyone is asking, though, is how long this United States-sponsored
initiative will last. The answer, it appears, is not long.
The
ceasefire agreement covers the India-Pakistan international border,
the Line of Control (LoC) that divides the those sections of Kashmir
administered by the two countries, and along the Actual Ground
Position Line in the Siachin Glacier.
Developments
leading up to the ceasefire actually started several weeks ago
when, under immense US pressure, Pakistan's Inter-Services-Intelligence
(ISI) shut down its "Forward Section 23" in Pakistan's
Azad (Free) Kashmir, which meant the closure of all training camps
and ISI operations offices in that region.
Not
only this, but also under US pressure, Pakistan was asked to provide
access to its national data base and records of those involved
in terror activities, which, according to the US definition, includes
militancy in the name of jihad. For this purpose, a special wing
was established in the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan
(FIA), which normally handles matters related to white-collar
crime.
This
special investigation cell is jointly headed by Fareed Nawaz of
the FIA and a member of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This is a clandestine operation to fight terror, and information
relating to it has been obtained by Asia Times Online,
it has not been officially disclosed.
The
cell has the mandate to compile records of those involved in terror
activities, collect their fingerprints and other details, and
then enter the data into a mainframe system connected to all FBI
offices and US immigration facilities world-wide. As a result
of this operation, banned militant outfits that had resumed operations
under another name were re-banned, and a number of activists arrested.
This time there was a difference, though. The entire records of
all suspects and organizations were seized for entry into the
"terror database".
According
to sources close to the Pakistani administration, the US leaned
heavily on the Pakistani leadership to force the ISI to abandon
its Kashmir operations in mid-stream. Just recently, a new recruitment
campaign for militants - to be used in cross-border raids into
Indian-administered Kashmir - was started in all big cities. And
militant organizations were given huge funds to mobilize their
activists and attract new recruits.
And,
it is said, President General Pervez Musharraf held meetings with
jihadi leaders in which he assured them that he supported "jihad
in Kashmir" with his "heart and soul". After these
assurances, the Jamaatut Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-i-Toiba) was
encouraged, with all means and resources, to stage a large gathering
in Mureedkey, Punjab, where thousands of jihadis gathered and
vowed to liberate Kashmir. Maulana Masood Azhar of the Khuddamul
Islam (effectively the Jaish-i-Mohammed) was also invited to address
the gathering.
Before
that gathering, Azhar paid frequent visits to the port city of
Karachi to revive 32 units out of about 148 that had existed until
the Jaish-i-Mohammed was banned. Before the last visit, a big
publicity campaign started, with about Rs 50,000 (US$870) paid
for wall posters alone. Subsequently, Azhar attracted about 7,000
people to north Karachi's famous Batha mosque. Azhar was visibly
protected by local police.
At
this point, a big operation in Kashmir appeared imminent in which
it was hoped to force the Indian leadership to resume dialogue
on the disputed territory on Pakistan's terms. Delhi, however,
responded by applying all its good offices with Washington. As
a result, the ISI's Mumbai connection, Indian underworld boss
Dawood Ibrahim, was declared a "global terrorist" by
the US, and the ISI took the decision to close its base operations
in Kashmir. The US even said that Dawood resided in Karachi, although
he has not been seen there for some time.
And
then, with the US beginning a new round of pro-Indian posturing,
Pakistan committed itself to a change in its mode of operations.
Traditionally, jihadis have penetrated into Indian territory from
Kashmir, but now the "launching" apparatus has been
moved to Karachi for militants to cross the border from Sindh
province into India, from where they will either make their way
to Kashmir or seek out soft targets in India.
Why
Pakistan cannot stop anti-Indian operations: Many thousands
of Pakistanis have fought in Afghanistan (during the anti-Soviet
campaign of the 1980s) and Kashmir over the past decade or more
as members of jihadi outfits. After the US attacked Afghanistan
in late 2001, it was largely predicted that these outfits - which
are loyal to the Taliban and al-Qaeda - would rush back to lend
their support, and that they would also rebel against Musharraf.
This
assessment proved to be a huge misconception. The jihadi outfits
were in fact a part of the ISI's operations and the brainchild
of late dictator General Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman.
The purpose was to develop a para-military force that would assist
the Pakistan army in the event of war. However, in the course
of the 1989 uprising in Kashmir, these jihadis played so vital
a role that they outdid the army, so in the 1990s it was decided
that they would act as a front-line force in any India-Pakistan
war.
First-hand
observations by this correspondent in Azad Kashmir camps confirm
that the jihadi outfits are in fact paramilitary troops. Each
unit has a commander who reports to an army officer. Each jihadi
commander is given funds and the brief to devise a strategy for
his unit's combat operations. The commanders have lap top computers
in which they store their data, from which they generate summaries
of their operations for their military officers. The summaries
include targets, operations and results. The jihadi commanders
and army field officers always coordinate their efforts. Pro-jihadi
clerics, like Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, are used to deliver sermons,
and they are not allowed to utter a single word more than the
topic on which they have been told to speak.
After
September 11, 2001, ties between the army and the jihadis were
at a crossroads, but they emerged as friends. Meetings were held
at ISI offices in Karachi, where Shamzai and others were told
the limits of their anti-US demonstrations. These clerics always
abide by such guidelines. Shamzai was also taken by the ISI to
North-West Frontier Province when tribals had blocked highways
in support of the Taliban, and he forced them to remove all blockades.
Interestingly,
some diehard jihadis with "original" thoughts came out
in favor of Osama bin Laden, including Maulana Abdul Jabbar of
the Jaish-i-Mohammed. Their jihadi fellows pointed this out to
the ISI, which advised him against such support. When he did not
give up, he was detained.
The
ISI reasoned with the jihadis that they had to compromise on al-Qaeda
as Pakistan did not have any strategic interests with the network.
However, Pakistan did have interests with the Taliban, the ISI
pointed out, so it would persuade the US to give them a role in
the government in Afghanistan. In essence, then, the so-called
jihadi-clerics are no more than the ISI's proxies, rather than
committed "ideologues".
Major
army interests in Kashmir: Apart from strategic interests,
the Pakistan army has interests in the "jihad of Kashmir",
from non-commissioned officers right up to the major-general who
looks after Forward Section 23. It has funds to run training camps,
including recruitment (Rs 10,000 for each recruit), and transportation
and accommodation costs. It also has a special fund for each "mujahid"
when he enters into Kashmir (Rs 20,000). Should he die, there
is a special fund for compensation (Rs 50,000 in the first year
and Rs 24,000 in next two years) for the bereaved family.
For
Pakistan then, the ISI, the jihadis and the army are in one mind
that the struggle in Kashmir will continue. All that is happening
for now, under US pressure, is a shift in tactics, with Karachi
becoming a center of activities. Realistically, the ceasefire
along the Line of Control in Kashmir cannot therefore be expected
to hold. - Courtesy Asia Times Online
