Read
Editor's Column on the Same Subject
Read
Praful Bidwai's Column
Is the New Ceasefire
a Farewell to Arms in Kashmir
By
Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri
INDIA
AND Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along the Line of Control,
the international border and the actual ground control line (AGPL)
in Sachin from Tuesday, 25 November, 2003.
The
modalities of the decision were finalized on Tuesday by Director-General
of Military Operations Lt. Gen. B.S. Takhar and his Pakistani
counterpart, Major Gen. Mohammad Yousuf.
The
ceasefire covers the 778 km long LoC, the 150 km long AGPL, and
the 198 km international border. However, while instructions were
sent to the armed forces not to fire at Pakistani positions, New
Delhi was also careful not to lower its guard. Officials repeated
that while there were indications from Islamabad that it wanted
to create positive atmosphere, an ambience of trust could be created
only when the infrastructure of terrorism was dismantled.
India and Pakistan may start playing cricket again. Many analysts
feel that any sign that hostility is easing between the two nuclear-armed
neighbors is worth cheering. Still, a far trickier game lies ahead
: solving the long-simmering dispute over Kashmir - and, specifically,
reining in the violent militants who keep the Kashmir pot boiling.
US President George W Bush recently sent Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage, an ex-wrestler, to New Delhi and Islamabad to
lend support - and apply pressure. Before Armitage landed, leaders
from both countries were quick to show Washington they were actively
pushing for peace. In addition to hurling cricket balls, India
and Pakistan have agreed to resume air and road links, as well
as restore full diplomatic relations, which they suspended 17
months ago.
But both sides know that any hope of peace talks could easily
be sabotaged by a violent incident like the March 24 massacre
of 24 Kashmiri Hindus by unidentified gunmen. Indeed, convincing
the militants to hand over their Kalashnikovs is the key to peace
in Kashmir - and it may prove impossible. Says Pervez Hoodbhoy,
a South Asia expert at the Quaid-i-Azam
University in Islamabad : “There are jihadis who want to
torpedo these negotiations.”
Publicly, at least, Pakistan is trying to distance itself from
Jihadis, a large number of whom, according to the Indian military,
are still operating in the Kashmir Valley. Armitage said that
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave him “absolute
assurance that there was nothing happening” across the Line
of Control and that guerrilla camps in Pakistan’s Kashmir
territory either no longer existed or “would be gone tomorrow”.
If
Pakistan does indeed seal off the Kashmir border, as the US is
insisting, some militant groups will wither, starved of Islamabad’s
covert training, arms and cash. Already in Muzaffarabad, the main
city in Pakistan’s side of Kashmir, unemployed jihadis are
scrapping through by driving cabs and tending shops. Their commanders
had to sell off fleets of four wheel-drive vehicles, gifts from
the Pakistani intelligence agencies. But the leader of a militant
group hasn’t lost hope.
“This American pressure will slow us, but it won’t
stop us”, he vows. “If the militancy ends, what will
bring India to the negotiating table ? Nothing.”
His view is shared by many Pakistani military officers: backing
the Kashmiri militants, whose ranks are swelling with Pakistani
recruits itching for a holy war against the Hindus, has been a
low-risk and cheap way to tie up hundreds of thousands of Indian
troops in the freezing mountains of Kashmir.
But some Pakistani intellectuals are starting to argue on another
line: that after 14 years of guerrilla fighting and more than
30,000 deaths in Kashmir, the Indians are not backing down. “You
can’t keep following this path if it leads nowhere,”
Hoodbhoy says.
This
opinion is gaining currency among influential government officials
and policy-makers, especially in the wake of Sept.11 and the Bush
administration’s success in Iraq. Convincing the generals
and their boss, Musharraf, who planned one of the most successful
incursions in the Kashmir conflict - the capture of several strategic
peaks in the Kargil region in 1999 - is a tougher job.
Still, Musharraf is halfway there. After Sept. 11, he earned kudos
from Washington for helping catch more than 450 al-Qaeda suspects
and trying to slow the flow of holy warriors into Indian-held
Kashmir. Although the number of crossing into Kashmir dipped slightly,
India now claims that Pakistani intelligence once again has opened
the tap, sending perhaps hundreds of fighters across every month
and furnishing them with guns, rocket-propelled grenades, radios
and daily intelligence on where Indian troops are patrolling.
For
the Bush administration, this presents a credibility gap. On a
recent visit to Washington, Gen. Eshan ul Haq, chief of Pakistan’s
leading spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was shown
evidence of the ISI’s continued dabbling in Kashmir. This
was followed up with a warning
that the Bush administration won’t tolerate Pakistan’s
provocative meddling any longer. And after Gulf War II, such warnings
tend to grab people’s attention.
Publicly, Pakistan says it’s not aiding the Kashmiri militants.
But privately, Pakistani officials have told the US that time
will be needed to scale down their country’s support for
the militants. Otherwise, they say Musharraf may face a backlash
from extremist cells, which still abound in
Pakistan, as well as from religious parties and some of his own
officers.
Pakistani
officials also argue that Musharraf does not exert full control
over the wilder extremists roaming Kashmir, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad
and Lashkar-e-Toiba, which are widely blamed for terrible civilian
atrocities.
Even
without support from Pakistan, though, the militants could wreck
havoc. One Jihadi in Muzaffarabad says that the guerrillas have
stashed huge supplies of weapons inside Indian-held Kashmir and
that they could press on with their war long enough to provoke
the Indians into breaking off peace talks.
In Muzaffarabad, militants say that they were recently told by
the ISI to “hibernate” - to lie low in case the upcoming
dialogue between India and Pakistan fails to yield any progress.
Then, say one commander from the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Pakistan support
will resume - covertly, as before.
Several
of the militants recently interviewed by American reporters failed
to mask their sense of betrayal by Islamabad. “We feel helpless
because we never thought that Pakistan would stop supporting us,”
says one militant from the Lashkar-e-Toiba who expressed his intention
to give up his cross-border attacks out of sheer frustration.
This indicates that ISI, despite its many
denials of helping the militants, still flexes some power over
the groups’ chiefs, if not their more extremist holy warriors.
According
to a high level US official, before peace talks can proceed, India
must also start making concessions. For starters, Pakistan wants
India to thin out its military presence in Kashmir. Pakistan also
talks about human-rights abuses - there are still 3,000 people
“missing” in Kashmir who were picked up for questioning
and never returned. Last year, after being elected Chief Minister
of Jammu and Kashmir state, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed dismantled the
feared special forces responsible for most of the abuses.
In Srinagar, Kashmir’s ancient lakeside city some Muslim
elders are encouraged by the words of peace emanating from New
Delhi and Islamabad. Abdul Ghani Bhat, chairman of the separatist
All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an alliance of 26 Kashmiri separatist
parties and groups, said he was “optimistic” about
the future. “The boys with guns will have to fall in line”,
said. They will have to listen to reason.”
For
now, the spectacle of India and Pakistan facing off on the cricket
field sounds like a welcome turnaround for everybody. But the
Kashmiris would appreciate something more - an enduring peace.
The
writer is Emeritus Professor, University Grants Commission, New
Delhi. Formerly Professor of International Relations Oxford University,
UK and Guest Professor of International Relations London School
of Economics & Political Science, Senior Fellow, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Research Coordinator,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Sweden.
