Issue No 18, Nov 18-24, 2002 | ISSN:1684-2075 | satribune.com


Opinion

 

How the Establishment is reacting to the surprise MMA Victory

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

Very few people are likely to say that they accurately predicted how well the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) would do in the general election. Indeed, most people were quite shellshocked – at least initially – at how many seats the MMA actually won.

And while the country as a whole continues to experience a limbo state in which the level of interest in who actually forms the government decreases by the day, it is worth it to consider how the establishment itself has reacted to the MMA establishing itself as a contender for state power.

There seems to be relative consensus amongst most objective observers that systematic attempts were made to marginalise the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (N). To the extent that it was possible, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) was the benefactor of the military’s attempts to ensure that its influence in government remains intact.

That said then, only a massive intelligence failure could explain the MMA sneaking in through the backdoor. But such a massive intelligence failure is unlikely. So, without propagating any more theories about the way in which outcomes were engineered, the fact is that there are a lot of questions that hang over the entire exercise, and whether one should really be that surprised about the MMA’s success.

It is possible (although unlikely) that there was less interference by the agencies than has been suggested. But the very fact that this sort of drama now seems to have become an integral part of the election process is incredibly disturbing. There are many possible permutations of how the elections were manipulated, and what the eventual outcome will be. If we did not already know that there is a serious problem with what has been termed – to give just two examples - “guided democracy” and “sustainable federal democracy”, we are now aware of just how farcical things have become.

The weeks after elections have given us the wonderful opportunity to witness even more horsing around than took place before elections. There have been new twists reported in every morning newspaper, and the whole spectrum of potential political alliances seems to have been exhausted. Between the three parties who have been at the forefront of this almost comical topi drama, there has been no shortage of playacting and posturing. And at the end of the day, the one and only thing that remains clear is that the parties that eventually come together to form the national government will still be answerable to big brother in uniform.

And so the state’s date with a crisis of legitimacy seems to have been set. At times such as these, one might expect mortals to rise to the occasion, to commit to extraordinary acts. But even if we cannot expect a unique response from those in positions of responsibility, perhaps we can rely on good old-fashioned long-term interest to inadvertently help us out of a bad situation. Ultimately, given the military’s continuing banter about continuity of its so-called reform agenda, it is difficult to expect that government will provide anything new in the coming months (or years if this government actually lasts). Following from this, it would not be surprising if the general public starts to feel even more desperate than it already does. And so is likely to come more disgust, disillusionment, and possibly even agitation-inducing anger.

That being assumed, it would be left to the third party, the one that stays out of government, to, quite crudely, capitalize on the likely public support that will follow opposition of what will essentially continue to be an anti-people agenda. This is precisely what the MMA did in this election. The state was pushing people to the margins after having already alienated them by supporting the demolition job of Afghanistan, and the MMA simply had to fuel the simmering discontent (notwithstanding what now almost everyone affectionately refers to as pre-poll rigging). Therefore, the third party should really be thinking at least as much about being in the opposition as about being in government.

After all, if and when elections come around again, one could well expect the electorate to hand the protest vote to the third party just as it did to the MMA this time around (the pre-poll rigging qualification again here). While all of this is merely hypothesizing, the practice of power politics has as much to do with perception as anything else. And so the third party would do well to think about how much it has to gain in the longer-run by staying out of government, perhaps engaging in more people-centred politics, and then really making a go at it the next time around.

Being in the opposition – whether in a formal parliamentary democracy or by way of a radical political movement - is an art, a form of politics that has all too often been overlooked in this country, as has any other practice of politics that has not involved the establishment and patronage. In the opposition, political parties are usually more willing to articulate democratic principles and support what can become populist struggles, especially in a country like Pakistan, and especially while the global tidal wave of unresponsive market-oriented electoral politics persists. So it is not even necessarily a question of making the more principled decision, but one of making the more logical decision as far as long-term interest.

Who will the third party eventually be? The PML (Q) secured itself a place in government a long time ago. In the interests of democracy and long-term stability, it may well be that the PPP would be the best candidate for the job. Benazir Bhutto would do well to think back to 1988 and her willingness to take office despite the clear influence she knew the military would continue to have on her government. The compromises of 1988 set the tone for the next 11 years, and in actuality, that saga continues today. If Benazir is truly convinced that Pakistan needs to move away from army-controlled government, then now would be the time to make a definitive move.

In the final analysis however, all parties seem willing to discard the baggage of principled positions in the interest of capturing state power. But Pakistan needs something more than this to have any hope of resuscitating this bad excuse for democracy. Even if the PPP ends up the third party and in the opposition by virtue of being frozen out, one hopes and expects that it will provide a spark to what will otherwise become an even more lifeless political process. Regardless, it is only when some robustness is introduced into this entire process that we can genuinely expect forward movement.

There are other considerations such as the fact that the MMA’s vote came almost exclusively from NWFP and Balochistan, and that the United States and the Western world at large have as much influence and interest in all of this as anyone else.

These issues are critical to the entire equation, the former reflecting an increasing ethnic divide within the country as well as the establishment’s conviction that Punjab politics is the only politics that matters (in terms of this being where the PML (Q) was given the real push), and the latter the loss of sovereignty of the state in general. But in many ways, being able to do something about these negative trends is contingent on acknowledgement that the perennial experiments with military-monitored politics have badly failed the country.

And then, somewhere down the line, we can start thinking about who actually comprises our political parties, if and how they represent our interests, and what we need to do to make them more responsive.

The military’s long-term romance with the affairs of the state has meant that our mainstream parties remain hostage to specific interest groups, groups that develop on-off alliances with the establishment to secure state power. Once this unfortunate pattern is disrupted can the people of this country finally start to think about actually getting something out of the electoral process.

 

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