Leader Washington Think Tank Issues
Report
Two Elections:
New Hopes and Old Frustrations
Mandavi
Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer
THE
TWO recent elections on the subcontinent, in Pakistan and in the
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, were conducted in environments
of skepticism and uncertainty. Both yielded upset victories. In
Pakistan, a hung parliament and the unexpectedly strong showing
of the religious parties raise questions about how the government
will deal with a political force that is hostile to its ties with
the United States and will push a hard line toward India.
The
Kashmir elections, on the other hand, are an opportunity for positive
change in the state, though their ultimate results will depend
on how willing the governments in Delhi and Islamabad are to create
a real peace process. For the United States, the main message
from the ballot box is that South Asia will remain volatile, but
that the stakes for U.S. interests are higher than ever.
Pakistan:
handicapped process, surprising results: The shifting
and controversial ground rules of the Pakistani election produced
a fragmented parliament. The Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam
(PML-QA), favored by Musharraf, emerged on top, with 77 out of
268 directly elected seats. In second place is the Pakistan People's
Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), the electoral version of Benazir
Bhutto's party. The surprise, however, was the performance of
the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religious
parties. Their 11 percent share of votes cast was in line with
their best previous performance. But the first-past-the-post system
and their disciplined approach earned them 45 seats, an unprecedented
18 percent of the National Assembly, plus control of one provincial
government and participation in a second. This makes them a major
political player rather than the marginal party they have been
in the past.
The
MMA campaigned against the U.S. war on terrorism and the U.S.
presence in Pakistan. It dominated the voting in areas bordering
Afghanistan, with a substantial Pashtun population deeply concerned
about Afghanistan. The MMA accounts for 80 percent of the parliamentary
seats from the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and will control
that provincial government. In Baluchistan, the MMA will lead
a provincial coalition government.
A
fragile coalition? Three weeks after the election, Musharraf is
still negotiating to form a government. His most likely options
are a government based on the PML-QA or an alliance between them
and the MMA. Either would involve cooperation between parties
that do not see eye to eye, and would yield a fragile government
and fractious National Assembly. Since the "King's Party"
has no clear leader, Musharraf is also looking for a prime minister
who will fit in with his own desire to maintain control. The likelihood
of some kind of showdown within the new government or between
the elected leaders and Musharraf within the next two years is
high.
Policy
impact in Pakistan: The elections pose little threat
to Musharraf's dominance of decisionmaking. The main thrust of
his economic reform policies will also survive, though soaring
poverty rates and an elected parliament will bring new pressures
for public spending. In other areas, the outlook is more troublesome.
Whether or not the MMA joins the government, and even if it tones
down its stridently anti-American campaign rhetoric, its members
will do their best to soften government restraints on the country's
Islamic militants and encourage continuing Pakistani support for
the Kashmir insurgency. They will push Musharraf to restrict the
role of U.S. law enforcement agencies in hunting down Taliban
and Al Qaeda remnants, especially in areas where the MMA is in
the provincial government. If the United States goes to war in
Iraq, that will be a potent source of new opposition to U.S. policy
extending well beyond the MMA.
This
election will encourage Musharraf to try to revive the old alliance
between the army and the religious right, at least in limited
form. Such an effort may not eliminate the threat he faces from
the most extreme militant elements, however. Violence against
foreigners and Christians is likely to continue, and Pakistan's
internal security will remain troubled.
Institutions
and "checks and balances": Musharraf established
the National Security Council (NSC) by decree before the election
"to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters
pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State;
and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial
harmony." This institution is central to his and the army's
strategy for keeping control over national security and foreign
policy, and over major 
aspects
of domestic politics. It is still unclear exactly what political
parties will be represented among the eight civilian members of
the NSC, but Musharraf and the four military commanders on the
council are likely to have the decisive say.
The
electoral results are not a promising backdrop for broader institutional
reform. The platforms of most parties other than the MMA did not
engage issues, but focused on running either with or against the
army. The steady decline in voter turnout in the past decade is
a depressing indication that few people have faith in the abilities
of either the army or political representatives to address their
needs. The parliament is unlikely to emerge as a strong institution.
Its parties remain largely subservient to their individual leaders.
The parties that form the MMA have deep sectarian differences.
The reorganization of the country's local institutions, launched
with such fanfare by Musharraf, is likely to take a back seat
to building coalitions and managing a volatile policy environment.
A ray of hope in Kashmir:
The run-up to the Kashmir elections, like the corresponding period
in Pakistan, was far from auspicious. The leaders of the All Parties
Hurriyet Conference (APHC), the umbrella group of political activists
in the Valley of Kashmir, were imprisoned, and the group boycotted
the elections. Election violence claimed over 700 lives, including
84 political workers and 2 candidates. Moderate Kashmiri leaders
feared for their lives after the assassination of the widely respected
politician Abdul Ghani Lone. Nonetheless, over 40 percent of the
electorate turned out and voted to end a generation of rule by
Farukh Abdullah's National Conference (NC), allied with the national
government in Delhi led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
A
move away from divisive politics: Most observers believe
that the NC's loss of its majority reflected anti-incumbency sentiments
and frustration over local issues. The NC-led government was known
for corruption and high-handedness, and development in the state
had been at a standstill. The state-run police had been a spoiler
in previous peace initiatives between the Indian government and
the Kashmiris.
The
new government is a coalition headed by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's
Popular Democratic Party (PDP), which won primarily in the Valley
of Kashmir, the heart of the state and the heart of the dispute
with Pakistan. The PDP's major partner is the Congress Party,
which won heavily in the Hindu-majority Jammu area. The Congress
showing was seen as a reaction against the BJP's communally divisive
politics. This is the first time in six years that the Kashmir
government has had a coalition partner connected with the opposition
to the central government. This may complicate its dealings with
Delhi.
Who
speaks for the Kashmiris? Because the major separatist groups
did not participate, the elections did not really resolve the
question of who speaks for Kashmiris. The Hurriyet sees itself
as the representative of the Kashmiris and has sought to represent
them in dialogues with the center and Pakistan. It is also engaged
in track-two efforts, such as the one with the Delhi-based Kashmir
Committee headed by former minister Ram Jethmalani. The Hurriyet
will press the new state government to include it in any future
dialogue. The state government, for its part, wants to start direct
talks with the central government on the state's future governance.
If the central government impedes the ability of the state government
to function, this will put the Hurriyet in the foreground once
again. And the NC remains the largest party in the assembly. The
role it chooses to play in the opposition will be critical.
The
social and political agenda: The PDP-Congress "common minimum
program" calls for the release of political prisoners, strengthening
of protections for human rights, investigation of custodial killings,
and the return of the Kashmiri Hindus forced out of their homes
in the state, along with progress on a host of economic, development,
and social issues. The Indian government has not blocked the state
government's first moves, such as announcing the disbanding of
special operations troops in the valley. Continued central-government
help and funding will be crucial.
The
trickiest issue, however, is shaping the future governance of
the state-the relationship of Kashmir to Delhi and, behind it,
the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Movement on talks in
the next six months is key, before the BJP becomes preoccupied
with forthcoming state elections and the prospect of national
elections in 2004. The concept underpinning the talks should be
changing political relationships, not the map.
Starting
a dialogue: Three levels of dialogue need to start. The
first is between the various constituencies and political parties
in Kashmir. The internal structure of this coalition should produce
a long-needed dialogue among the different subregions within Kashmir.
The chief minister has reached out to the Hurriyet, and this needs
to continue. The second level is between the state and the central
government. The state government will carry out this discussion
at the official level, but there will be a continuing need for
an unofficial channel, as a forum for candid and wide-ranging
discussion. The third level involves Pakistan. The Kashmiris would
like to be direct participants in this, though it remains unclear
who in Kashmir would take the reins. The Hurriyet would like to
be the bridge builder and an active participant. The national
government, however, will insist on maintaining full control of
any discussions with Pakistan.
Spoilers:
Pakistan and the externally based militant groups have been alienated
by the Kashmir elections. Neither will welcome progress in relations
between the state and the government of India, and both will be
tempted to play the spoiler's role. The political situation in
Kashmir is very fragile, and the peace constituency is passive.
These are factors that militant groups can easily exploit.
Impact
on the United States: In Pakistan, the long-term interests of
the United States are tied to long-term stability in the country,
which in turn requires viable political institutions. The path
to a more stable democracy may involve messy politics in the short-term.
The United States needs to engage the elected representatives
and the new government and formulate a farsighted policy toward
Pakistan, keeping the interplay with India and Kashmir in mind.
In
Kashmir, the United States will want to encourage India and Pakistan
to create conditions in which dialogue can move forward. This
will require creativity and restraint from both. The twin dangers
that threaten this much-needed, quiet U.S. role are the looming
war in Iraq, which will absorb Washington's entire attention,
and the wild card represented by the MMA's strong showing in Pakistan.
Courtesy
South Asia Monitor, published by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution
focusing on international public policy issues.
