A
Mullahs protest rally in Karachi
General
Zia Promoted Sectarianism, Musharraf Should End It
By
Shahid Anwar
TOBA TEK SINGH, Pakistan: Proliferation of sectarianism is proportionately
related to Mullahs' corresponding rise to position of influence
and power in Pakistan.
How
did they acquire ascendancy out of social and political obscurity?
How damaging the menace of sectarianism is for the State and the
society of Pakistan? Is there any way left to restore peace and
order in the society?
Before independence Mullahs enjoyed little social clout in the
areas which form Pakistan. Despite having some separate sectarian
consciousness there was no bad blood between Shias and Sunnis.
They lived quite amicably and peacefully with each other.
Mullahs
incrementally rose to the position of influence after independence.
Religious lobby's rhetorical and ritualistic approach towards
Islam coupled with pressure on State for its implementation through
legislation and enforcement created the context for sectarianism.
The
previously dormant sectarian rivalries were awakened in the environment
of competition to influence the public policy. Naturally when
the State has to be closely identified with a narrowly conceived
precept of Islam, minority sects were bound to feel insecure and
vulnerable. Thus the seeds for sectarian divide were sown in the
early days after independence. Mullahs' rise to the position of
influence in society and state structure coincides with the rise
of sectarianism in Pakistan.
General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq is widely considered responsible for
triggering a process of sectarianism as a byproduct of his Islamization
drive. He toppled the government of first elected Prime Minister
of Pakistan and created a political vacuum and sought to legitimize
his regime in the name of Islam; which unleashed the forces of
ethnicity and sectarianism.
His
attempts to Islamize the society through State apparatus were
partly driven by his quest for legitimacy and partly because he
subscribed to views of Jamaat-e-Islami-which is ardent supporter
of Islamic enforcement through coercive State authority.
The
convergence of regime's political instinct for survival and ideology
caused great damage to social fabric of society by unleashing
the genie of sectarianism. The drive for enforcement of Islam
raised the theological questions in the society. Which sect's
fiqah will be implemented? Sunnis had little to worry
as they enjoyed a dominating majority against the tiny but influential
Shia minority. So Shia's sense of insecurity led them to organize
and put forward their own set of demands. Tehreek-e-Nifaz Fiqa-e-Jafria
called for implementation of their version of Islam in Pakistan.
Apart from these internal dynamics, geopolitical change in the
region and the following international response not only strengthened
the sectional religious identities rather it also militarized
the groups. The 1979 revolution in Iran by Imam Khomeini and invasion
of Afghanistan by the USSR drastically changed the regional as
well as international scenario.
The
Middle Eastern monarchies felt threatened by the spillover effects
of the Iranian revolution. America lost her staunch ally King
Zahir Shah and thus lost US bases in Iran. America got a chance
to stage a strong comeback in Middle East and also a favorable
war theater in Afghanistan to settle the score with the USSR.
First international Jihad machine was mobilized with the active
support of predominantly Sunni (Wahabi) state of Saudi Arabia
and other Arab Muslim states.
Pakistan
became the frontline state of this jihad against the Communist
aggression. This war brought serious long-term consequences for
Pakistan. Mullahs gained unprecedented clout due to their close
coordination with State's security agencies.
To
recruit Mujahideen for Afghan war Mullahs got encouragement and
indirect and direct financial grants to establish Madrassas. It
has been pointed out that Zia already was playing god to people
for his personal religious leanings and domestic political reasons.
For these domestic and external reasons Madrassa-religious schools
proliferated in Pakistan at massive scale.
The
US strategic interests involved containment of USSR and to encircle
Khomeini's Iran. The Saudis and other Arab Kingdoms also shared
these concerns for their own reasons. So the Saudis invested a
lot of funds on Jihad business through official and non-official
channels. Resultantly, the Wahabis - formerly considered an out
class - got more clout and power.
On
the other hand Shias of Pakistan also felt encouraged by Iranian
support. Dr Iffat Idris has pointed out that: "For a period,
Shia and Sunni sectarian groups were sponsored by Iran and Saudi
Arabia respectively. These two rivals fought a proxy war in Pakistan".
All these Madrasa students were meant to fight for Islam in Afghanistan.
Thus they were trained by Pakistan security agencies. In the process
they experienced the impact and influence of firepower. During
the long years of Russian occupation from 1979 to 1989 the Mujahideen
had a common enemy to fight against.
But
after the withdrawal of the USSR, internal ethnic, racial and
sectarian divisions of Mujahideen groups surfaced, and they indulged
in equally bitter in-fighting. Given the level of involvement
in Afghan affairs and presence of millions of Afghan refugees,
Pakistan was bound to be affected.
Thus
the combination of domestic and external factors like: social
context of poverty and insufficient infrastructure of education,
politically motivated Islamization drive, and the strategic policy
pursed by the US-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan in response to regional
geopolitical situation, created an irregular army of Mujahideen,
an economy of Jihad, and hundreds of 'religious schools preaching
a narrow and violent version of Islam'.
Against this backdrop, the race for setting up rival sectarian
outfits started and Pakistan became the battleground for foreign
and domestic forces seeking preponderance. On the one hand Saudi
Arabia and Iran did 'fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil', on
the other hand armed fighters of hostile sects held society hostage.
As
the offshoot of first Afghan jihad and later on Kashmir policy,
religious fanatics started to operate with impunity within Pakistan.
They have been engaged in random as well as targeted killings
of followers of opposite sects. A number of Shia doctors, highly
qualified professionals, and even high-ranking officials have
been killed in the recent years.
Violence
begets violence, so the perpetrators of sectarian violence themselves
have become the victim of such killings. For instance Maulana
Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Zia-ul-Rehman Farooqi, and Maulana Azam Tariq
chief of SSP, all became the victim of violence they had preached
and practiced. According to data collected by Institute for Conflict
Management, from 1989 to 2003, some 3378 people have been injured
and 1481 have been killed in 1818 incidents of sectarian violence.
The State has been generally unwilling or unable to respond appropriately
to sectarian threat to social fabric of society. In the first
place the very phenomenon of sectarianism was the outcome of ill
conceived Islamization and Jihad policy.
So
the State and society had to reap the whirlwind of their own creation.
Despite the rising cost in terms of loss of human lives, deteriorating
law and order situation, ramification for political and economic
health, and the negative image of country, no administration stood
up to the challenge so far.
Currently,
we are left with no other option but to rise to the challenge
or let ourselves slide into anarchy and barbarism of the dark
ages. There is though light at the end of the tunnel, as the common
people of Pakistan have not yet been infected by the deadly virus
of sectarianism. So the ultimate hope lies with the people known
as the 'silent majority'.
But
they need to break the silence. And the State should empower them
in real terms. This is the only way to establish the writ of the
State.
The writer is an independent political analyst with an academic
background in political science and US studies. Email: shahidanwar91@hotmail.com
