Pakistani
troops block a Karachi road after a terrorist attack: Training
for Iraq?
Pakistan’s
Troubling Dilemma: Can Troops be Sent to Iraq
By
Dr. Moeed Pirzada
LONDON: On 8th June, US and the Britain were able to win unanimous
support for a new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq. This
follows the creation of an interim government in Baghdad. The
whole process enjoyed indirect UN cover, from the very beginning
though the nature of negotiations, in the end, raised much doubts
about the efficacy of the structure that has been put into place.
The
resolution 1546, that in the end, won by a margin of 15-0 incorporated
many amendments that were offered to win support of all sides
especially the French and the German.
This now confronts Pakistan with
a very interesting and important question: Will its troops now
be landing in Iraq as peacekeepers; ostensibly to protect the
UN mission in Iraq?
It is an open secret that Islamabad,
now almost for the last one year, has been trying to find ways
and means to send its soldiers to Iraq. In fact last year for
a short while both India and Pakistan were in competition to oblige
Washington on this count before India backed down under domestic
opposition and Pakistan had to shelve its half baked real politick
ambitions when UN suddenly withdrew from Iraq after the gruesome
bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad.
But
the issue kept on simmering below the public eye. It was in the
air even before the US ambassador, Ms. Nancy Powell, brought it
out during a meeting with the foreign office in April. Later,
in the second week of May, the visiting US Assistant Secretary
of state for South Asia, Ms. Christina Rocca, apparently discussed
it with the top officials including the President and the Prime
Minister. To some observers Pakistan’s status as major non-Nato
ally should also be interpreted in the sequence of this process.
Last year Pakistan was repeating
the mantra of ‘troops only under the UN mandate’;
however in the last few weeks Foreign Office has made certain
cosmetic improvements in its wish list. In the last few weeks
it has been asserting that four conditions must be met before
troops can be sent: One, under the mandate of Security Council;
second, only to protect the UN mission in Iraq; third, only if
they are welcome by the Iraqis and fourth, if the decision is
acceptable to Pakistani people.
With the resolution 1546 of 8th June, it is obvious that the first
three conditions set by the Foreign Office will soon be met -
though the welcome by the Iraqis leaves much to fertile imagination
- but what about the acceptance by the Pakistani people? Does
it even matter?
Pakistan’s ambassador to the
UN, Mr. Munir Akram, while commenting upon the vote on resolution
1546, has said: “We view this resolution as the most significant
step since the first gulf war towards the full normalization of
the situation in Iraq”
And in words that can be considered
setting the tone for the coming decision making in Islamabad he
said: “Peace and stability in Iraq will no doubt reinforce
stability in the region; and its continued instability on the
other hand is likely to have an adverse impact on the security
environment of the region and beyond”. Though he stopped
short of making a direct reference to sending troops but the words
and the tone certainly suggest the mind of an ambassador whose
country yearns to play a role.
But how and by what magic trick will
Islamabad obtain the blessing and acceptance of the Pakistani
people remains to be seen. Will this issue be discussed in the
parliament where arms can be conveniently twisted or Prime Minister
will simply own a Presidential decree? Irrespective of the modality,
given the public sentiments and perceptions in Pakistan, the issue
will be widely controversial and deeply divisive especially at
a time when some sort of political reshuffling appears to be taking
shape in Islamabad.
Yet, in the logic of ‘real
politick’ sending troops to Iraq can be effectively defended.
There is no shortage of such decisions in history when governments
take extremely unpopular steps in the perceived larger national
interest. Legendary British prime minister of 19th century, Benjamin
Disraeli, used to support the ‘infidel Ottomans’ against
‘Czarist Russia, to maintain the balance of power in Europe,
at a time when his population hated the Turks due to their atrocities
against fellow Christians in Balkans and Greece.
In more recent days Tony Blair and
the British establishment were convinced that, irrespective of
the logic of this war, sticking close to the Americans is the
only way that guarantees Britain a role in the world beyond its
actual size. Former Spanish PM, Jose Maria Azner, was motivated
by the deeply felt desire to enhance the Spanish self image- battered,
bruised and troubled since the days of Spanish American wars.
Though
the great majority of Pakistani public, political elite, Media
and opinion makers-including the retired army officers whose opinions
we regularly see in Pakistani papers- are averse to the idea of
sending troops yet many in the government circles see an opportunity
for Pakistan. They think such a decision will help increase country’s
political space in the international arena; and the fact that
troops, once sent, will stay put for at least a year will help
traverse any rough weather during the transition of power in Washington.
Given this deep cleft between the
‘inner mind’ of the establishment and public sentiments
the Pakistani dilemma becomes all the more interesting.
Three closely interrelated factors are important in assessing
the Pakistani dilemma: One, What are the real objectives of the
Musharraf government? Second, how it will sell its decision, if
at all, to the Pakistani public across its political divides all
of whom share a deep seated fear and suspicion of the US intentions
on Pakistan, this region and the larger Islamic world; Third,
what is the emerging American vision on Iraq; are there any compromises
in the offing to buy greater French, German and Russian support
in the Security Council?
Unlike
the Disraeli, Blair and Azner governments referred to above Musharraf
regime lacks any credible democratic dispensation that can forge
and sustain a consensus in the face of opposition or like Spain
provide for respectable safety valves if the going gets difficult.
This makes the question of Islamabad’s objectives all the
more important
Pakistan has benefited, since 9/11,
not only by the political and financial leverage, which Washington
has provided it, but also from the direct and indirect support
in international forums from UN to WTO to Commonwealth. Additionally
State department, under Collin Powell, Armitage and Christina
Rocca, has struggled hard to instill confidence in Delhi and Islamabad
that this time around its engagement in South Asia will not be
allowed to turn into a zero sum game.
But
Washington’s support has also allowed Gen. Musharraf to
buy political legitimacy for democratic facades at home.
If
Pakistan now takes the decision to send troops to Iraq the question
is can it be sold to Pakistani public as part of a larger coherent
vision in which Pakistani state can be seen as a mature responsible
partner that helps in bringing stability to the region? to the
Islamic world? or else will it be seen as a move motivated by
narrow parochial self interest of Musharraf regime to earn US
good will and legitimacy; a move that may help in dodging commitments
on taking off uniform by the end December.
Leadership in every country has to
conceive and contrive messages for galvanizing public opinion.
These messages must connect with the overall consciousness of
the people: their sense of identity, history, fundamental values
and hopes and fears that inspire their inner most recesses of
the mind. This is precisely why Messrs Bush and Blair had to invent
the lollypop of “WMD” and “liberating the Iraqi
people” and that is precisely why President Bush keeps on
talking in terms of faith, trust, terror, darkness etc to appeal
to the most basic and fundamental instincts of the American people.
But
what message, what story, Musharraf government can harp to Pakistanis?
From times immemorial, and to this
day, powerful men satisfied their momentary physical needs through
mistresses. They showered them with gold and silver but seldom
felt comfortable or safe to honor the relationship as marriage.
Many Pakistanis have often viewed the US-Pak relations in a similar
light.
This
is why the symbolic American acts like ‘Major Non-Nato Ally’
become important in assuring a troubled Pakistani psyche. And
this is why the decision regarding Pakistani troops needs careful
consideration by both Islamabad and State Department in Washington.
If Pakistani public sees itself exploited and humiliated in the
process; if this results in Gen. Musharraf not honoring his commitments
regarding his uniform; and if this results in retarding the process
of democratic transition in Pakistan then far from expanding and
cementing US-Pakistan relations it will ruin the progress achieved
since 9/11.
Lets turn to third and perhaps the
most important aspect of this discussion. As one reflects on the
lessons of the last one year it becomes clear that unless the
US administration brings sincerity of purpose, sense of direction
and clarity of mind no amount of foreign blessings, support or
troops will be able to deliver stability to Iraq. But is there
a new evolved and coherent US view on Iraq? or the interim arrangement
is a mere tactic to shift painful media attention away from the
US role in the run up to the presidential election?
The
proposed UN resolution stipulates that the interim administration
will hold elections not later than 31st Jan 2005 and the resulting
constituent assembly will then work on a constitution. The latest
UN resolution was revised more than once during the debate in
the Security Council to buy French and German support; and this
resolution now stipulates: Iraqi security apparatus under Iraqi
control; close cooperation between the US lead MNC and the Iraqi
security forces; and oil and gas revenues under the Iraqi control.
Though
the French and German desire to award a veto to the Iraqis on
any ‘Fallujah type’ delicate operation has not been
agreed Iraqis will apparently have some say in such decisions
and the interim government, at least in theory, can tell the US
lead MNC to leave, though no one imagines a US blessed interim
arrangement to muster this kind of initiative.
But despite these much celebrated measures the preponderance of
evidence points towards, for all practical purposes, an impotent
entity erected to take responsibility and blame without having
any real authority. Ironically this reminds students of recent
middle eastern history of the ‘Palestinian Authority’
in occupied territories whose creation was opposed by the then
leading Palestinian intellectuals including late Edward Said of
Columbia University on the grounds that responsibility without
real authority is a recipe for total disaster.
Many
ministers in this interim government, including both the Prime
minister, Iyad Allawi, and President Ghazi Yawar are from the
hand picked ‘Iraqi Governing Council’ an entity that
enjoyed little credibility among the Iraqis or the neighboring
Arabs. Interestingly Mr. Allawi who enjoys the public reputation
of a CIA funded politico was neither selected by UN envoy Mr.
Brahimi nor by the members of the Governing Council but was simply
nominated by the Americans.
The
embarrassment, which UN suffered through the whole drama, is a
story in itself. This is perhaps further compounded by the latest
disclosures in the New York Times that in Mr. Iyad Allawi, in
early nineties, remained instrumental in smuggling special car
bombs for sabotage against the then Saddam government. Most of
those bombs, in different hands, are now being used to create
havoc in Iraq by the insurgents.
American
pressure tactics on the selection of the President failed but
only after raising the troubling question that if the US is finding
it desirable and difficult to control an entity totally of its
own creation then what about the elections? how will the US be
dealing with the constituent assembly? And how will it interact
with the increasingly assertive Iraqi leadership?
Already
the Kurdish political leadership, deeply dissatisfied with the
latest UN resolution which fails to address political rights for
the Kurds, is demanding autonomy from Iraq. Now whatever that
means in the prevailing circumstances is anybody’s guess
but it is not difficult to see that months ahead are anything
but smooth.
It is understandable that, given
the real politick ambitions of the government, Foreign Office,
in Islamabad, must be studying this situation very cautiously
but as of now there is no easy way out of the inherent contradictions
of this dilemma.
The writer is member of the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, London. An earlier version of this article appeared in
Pakistani Daily Dawn on June 7, 2004
