Pakistani
troops salute those killed in terrorist attack on June 10 in Karachi
The
Will to Take On the Terrorists is Missing
By Irfan Husain
KARACHI:
The recent spate of violence in Karachi, the attack on the Corps
Commander killing at least 12 soldiers in Clifton included, underlines
yet again the challenges Pakistan faces from extremists of every
stripe who are operating with impunity across the country.
The
killers are ruthless men without conscience or a shred of decency,
and the victims are innocent people who were at the wrong place
at the wrong time. But there is no `hidden hand', as politicians
are fond of repeating: the murderers belong to indigenous, home-grown
groups known to the intelligence agencies, and many of them have
links with political parties.
In
a recent interview with BBC World, I was asked about the Information
Minister's statement to the effect that the government was considering
'stern measures' to curb sectarian violence. The interviewer pointed
out that many such promises had been made in the past, but nothing
had changed.
One
problem is that the entire law-enforcement machinery is in such
shambles that any two-bit thug can commit a crime of violence
and reasonably expect to get away with it. And if he is miraculously
arrested, he can be pretty sure that he will get bail and be free
to continue with his career. By the time his case comes up for
hearing, he will have had plenty of time to frighten any witnesses
into changing their testimony.
This
deterioration of crime detection and punishment has been steady
and progressive: we have now reached a point where many judges
are scared to try those accused of terrorism. The State is unable
to protect them, as evident from the number of judges (and lawyers)
who have been attacked in recent years.
In
countries free of such systematic and sustained terrorism, the
State has retained a virtual monopoly on violence. Weapons, especially
automatic ones, are very difficult to come by. The sale of explosives
is tightly monitored. And offenders are strictly dealt with. America
is the only developed nation with very lax gun control laws, and
for this reason, it has a high incidence of gun-related crimes.
But extremist groups are closely watched.
In
Pakistan, by contrast, the State lost its monopoly on violence
a very long time ago. Indeed, the 'autonomy' granted to the tribal
areas in Balochistan and the NWFP was a sure-fire formula for
anarchy. The legal right to carry unlicensed weapons, and the
presence of weapons centers like Darra, meant that a large number
of Pakistanis were free to resort to guns to settle disputes.
In normal countries, resolving such matters is the exclusive preserve
of the State.
While
it might have been politically expedient to accept the status
of the tribal areas in the early days of Pakistan, no government
has ever made an effort to end this anarchic state of affairs.
The result is that tribals in Wana can now successfully take on
the Pakistan army and inflict heavy casualties with their modern
arsenal.
During
the Afghan war, the weaponisation of Pakistan accelerated, for
it was during this period that ethnic and sectarian outfits like
the MQM and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi came into being. While the dictator's
agenda revolved around his political survival, the armed and dangerous
groups he left as his legacy have grown and mushroomed.
Today, extremism in Pakistan is of
ethnic, sectarian and political dimensions. Different groups have
different targets, and many of their gunmen freelance as killers
who can be hired to settle scores or for straight monetary gains.
The lethal permutations here are virtually infinite. The Shia-Sunni
slaughter alone has claimed 4,000 lives in the last fifteen years.
Another
reason for the seemingly unchecked growth of these organizations
is that many of the outfits were used by successive governments
to further Pakistan's perceived interests in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Many of us had been warning of the danger for years, but delusions
of `strategic depth' convinced the authors of such half-baked
strategies that this was a price worth paying.
Two
years after the Taliban's fall, we still have to suffer the depredations
of the same pro-Taliban elements that flocked to their banner
in Afghanistan. Similarly, while we have pledged not to permit
militants to infiltrate into Indian Kashmir, nothing has been
done to clamp down on them at home.
Having
used them to support official policy, the government finds it
very difficult to lock them up and prosecute them. Intelligence
agencies have dossiers on all these groups, but their official
handlers have developed close links with these terrorists, and
are thus reluctant to arrest them.
The
pervasive miasma of officially inspired piety, together with the
rapid proliferation of madrassas is another major factor in the
rise of sectarian violence. Thousands of young men graduate from
these seminaries every year, unequipped to find jobs in the real
world. Many of them end up with jihadi gangs, and are soon brainwashed
to attack whatever target their cynical leaders designate. Convinced
that their acts of violence will win them a place in paradise,
they are not very different from the original Assassins led by
Hasan bin Sabbah in the 11th century from Alamut.
Why
is Karachi the hub of extremism? Perhaps because it is a microcosm
of the beliefs, peoples and tensions that make up Pakistan. As
an enormous metropolis with vast slums, it is easy for shadowy
killers to melt into the anonymous crowds that inhabit the city.
Then, too, it is the commercial center of the country, and money
attracts criminals the way honey attracts bees.
So what can this government do to
crush this menace? Well, Jamali could consider taking a leaf from
the Mongols' book as they set out to eradicate the powerful Assassins.
This sect, in its active lifetime
of 150 years, had sent out its killers to many capitals where
they eliminated those deemed harmful to its interests. They inspired
fear as hashish-fuelled assassins (the word comes from their use
of the drug), brainwashed into believing that by carrying out
their assignment they would go straight to heaven, carried out
the most daring murders.
Halaku
attacked Alamut in 1256, forcing the Assassin Grand Master Rukn
Al-Din to surrender. He was executed almost immediately. Four
years later, the Mamluk Sultan Baibars wiped out the Assassin
hill-fortresses in Syria, ending this menace forever. The Mongols
had decided that enough was enough, and marshaled all the resources
needed to eliminate these killers.
Basically, they summoned up the necessary
political will to see the task through from start to finish. This
is what the government needs to demonstrate now if it is serious
about wanting to end the country's distress at the hands of vicious
killers.
The
writer is a well known Pakistani analyst and commentator who also
writes under the name of Mazdak in Daily Dawn.
