'We should
not go beyond stated positions in Kashmir'
Funeral
of Kashmiri leader Moulvi Mushtaq Ahmed in Srinagar on June 8
Militarization
of Pakistan is Going Far Beyond the Bounds of Necessity
By
Ayaz Amir
ISLAMABAD:
Speaking at what passes for a think-tank, the Institute of Regional
Studies in Islamabad, President Musharraf has called for "sincerity"
in resolving the Kashmir dispute. If the leadership on both sides
was sincere a solution to this problem could be found.
Like
charity, sincerity too should begin at home. And its starting
point in relation to Kashmir is the abiding truth that what you
fail to win on the battlefield, you cannot win at the negotiating
table.
(Indian
Foreign Minister Natwar Singh said last week the border between
India and Pakistan could again be adjusted, as it was adjusted
in 1971, meaning a give and take in Kashmir was possible).
Pakistan has fought two-and-a-half
wars - the half being Kargil - to wrest Kashmir from Indian control
or at least to change the status quo in Kashmir. The first fought
in 1947-48 was the most advantageous from Pakistan's point of
view because the one-third of Kashmir it occupies is the fruit
of that.
The
second in 1965 was a strategic defeat, because setting out to
liberate Kashmir, the Pakistan army found itself defending Lahore
and Sialkot. The third in Kargil, General Musharraf's personal
contribution to the annals of Kashmir warfare, was a predictable
disaster because it lacked any clear aim.
Far from focusing attention on the
need for a Kashmir solution, it put the spotlight on Pakistan's
sponsorship of "cross-border terrorism". After Sep 11
a combination of American and Indian pressure compelled Gen Musharraf
to give assurances about rolling up "jihad" in Kashmir.
The Line of Control is thus not a
whimsical line on the map. It marks the farther-most limits of
Pakistani military prowess. Beyond this line we couldn't go. There
can be nothing more concrete than this.
We
waged war to bring India to the negotiating table but the Dien
Bien Phu our generals hoped for, never happened. Instead, our
wars exposed the limits of our capability and cast a wan light
on many of our cherished illusions (mostly to do with our valor
and Indian weakness).
From 1989 onwards we looked to "jihad"
as a way to bleed India and unfreeze Kashmir. India has paid a
price and continues to do so. But it is no closer to quitting
Kashmir now than it was when the insurgency began.
In fact, the insurgency peaked long
ago and "jihad" fatigue has set in. How does "sincerity"
fit into this equation? Are we saying that India should do voluntarily,
on the basis of sincerity, which we failed to make it do through
the use of arms?
India wants a solution too because
it can do without this festering wound. But on its terms especially
when Pakistan has exhausted other options. Pleading for a solution
satisfactory to all three sides - India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris
- is laudable but scarcely realistic.
Without
saying so explicitly, Pakistan wants the division of Kashmir along
communal lines, with the Valley acceding to Pakistan or enjoying
some kind of international status. A section of Kashmiri Muslims
favors accession to Pakistan. But the majority probably is in
favor of independence, a plague on both your houses being its
motto. How do you reconcile these conflicting positions?
There is the Irish solution based
on the Good Friday agreement with Northern Ireland continuing
to be a separate entity but with an assembly representing both
shades of Northern opinion, Unionist and Republican.
Only
problem is that unlike Northern Ireland, there is no IRA (Irish
Republican Army) in Kashmir, a body speaking unequivocally for
all Kashmiri Muslims, whether in favor of the armed struggle or
not.
In Northern Ireland the IRA led the
political struggle and also commanded the gun. An indigenous organization,
it acted on its own and did its own thinking. In contrast, Pakistan's
intelligence agencies put their stamp on the Kashmiri freedom
struggle, not allowing it to develop an autonomous character.
The result is that while the All
Parties Hurriyet Conference leads the political struggle, it has
no control over the gun, most of the jihadi organizations drawing
sustenance from private outfits in Pakistan.
This
is a repeat of our Afghan failure when Pakistan's intelligence
agencies insisted on controlling the Afghan resistance, now propping
up one favorite, now another. When Najib fell, there was no cohesive
entity to fill the vacuum.
We have a standpoint on Kashmir and
let's not abandon it. Let the Line of Control remain a temporary
line and not be turned into an international frontier. We are
on unassailable moral ground when we insist on the Kashmiri right
of self-determination.
Let us stick to this standpoint and
not say, as Gen Musharraf has on more than one occasion, that
we should go beyond stated positions. While this sounds eminently
reasonable, in the context of Kashmir it amounts to nullifying
the UN resolutions. Once that happens, we have no leg to stand
on.
But while sticking to our position,
let us also realize that no Kashmir solution is going to emerge
tomorrow. Anyone can beat an empty drum. It takes courage and
wisdom to make the best of an imperfect situation and accept the
inevitable.
Is this too tough a proposition for
Pakistani minds to accept? We got used to the loss of East Pakistan
with remarkable ease. East Pakistan was half of Pakistan, Kashmir
never a part of us. Nor did Kashmir figure in the partition plan
leading to India's independence and the birth of Pakistan, as
a princely state falling in a different category.
Strange, to say the least, that whereas
the loss of half our body and soul is not a "core issue",
the future of Kashmir is. For too long we have been governed by
the pseudo-strategic preoccupations of GHQ and ISI. We know where
these can lead. Our foremost concern should be the plight of the
Kashmiri people.
If India continues to trample human
rights in the Valley, our voice should be with the Kashmiris.
If they want independence, so be it. If they settle for a better
deal within the Indian Union, we should have the heart to work
for that through quiet diplomacy. But let us stop saying that
Kashmir is the core issue between India and Pakistan for it is
not.
While
with all our expenditure of defence we are no closer to liberating
Kashmir, all this talk of core issue serves as an excuse to make
the military the holiest cow in the Pakistani pantheon. We should
not neglect our armed forces.
No nation should. But here the issue
is the militarization of Pakistan going far beyond the bounds
of necessity. It is a sobering thought to realize that the military
today is far bigger than when there was both West and East Pakistan
to defend.
And then we bemoan the sorry state
of democracy. How can a fragile plant grow under a banyan tree?
Consider another question. The primary aim of the Pakistan movement,
from where it all began, was to provide constitutional safeguards
for Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces who were afraid of
being swamped by a Hindu majority.
Being in a majority, the Muslims
of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Frontier felt threatened by
no one. It is an irony of history that those most in need of protection
were left behind in India, while those who didn't need any protection
inherited the new state.
This is water under the bridge but
given this background, don't we have a moral obligation to see
that our policies don't hurt the interests of Indian Muslims?
From
the strong impression one gathers while visiting India, most Indian
Muslims are not in favor of Kashmir leaving the Indian Union.
For they look upon the division of Kashmir along communal lines
as (1) a threat to Indian secularism, after all their strongest
safeguard, and (2) a diminution of their collective strength.
The invocation of sincerity should take all these factors into
account. - Courtesy Dawn
