US
Under Secretary John Bolton testifying before Congressional Committee
Bush Official
Denies, Admits, Denies Musharraf Knew About Nuclear Sales
Special
SAT Report
WASHINGTON: A top Bush Administration official has conceded, albeit
reluctantly, that Pakistan’s General Pervez Musharraf might
have been aware of the nuclear sales by Dr. AQ Khan's network
to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
Questioned by a House of Representatives Committee about whether
there was evidence that General Musharraf was complicit in nuclear
sales by Dr. AQ Khan's network to Iran, Libya and North Korea,
the official said that while General Musharraf might have been
aware of such sales, he might have been politically unable to
stop them because Dr. Khan was "an icon in Pakistan -the
father of the nuclear weapons program."
In testimony on March 30 before the House International Relations
Committee in Washington, Under Secretary of State, John R. Bolton,
said Iran had a "massive deception and denial campaign"
aimed at preventing international inspectors from uncovering that
country's "robust" biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons programs.
"It is clear that Iran draws from many of the same networks
that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components and materials,
including the AQ Khan black market network," he said, referring
to the network run by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program. Mr. Bolton called destroying the network through sanctions
and other steps "a priority objective of the United States."
Mr.
Bolton said he believed that President Musharraf might finally
have been emboldened by the revelations last year of Iran's illicit
nuclear activities and Libya's decision to renounce weapons of
mass destruction.
Mr. Bolton, bristled visibly when committee Democrats suggested
that he and other administration officials were overlooking Pakistani
proliferation activities because of that state's cooperation in
fighting terrorism. "If we had information about complicity
of top levels of the government of Pakistan, we would act on it,"
Mr. Bolton said.
The New York Times has reported that the Bush administration
is imposing sanctions on 13 foreign companies and individuals
in seven countries that it says have sold equipment or expertise
that Iran could use in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
programs, according to administration and congressional officials.
The sanctions will prohibit the companies and individuals from
exporting goods to or receiving contracts or assistance from the
United States and will prevent American companies from trading
with them for two years. Officials said the sanctions were being
imposed under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which prevents
sales of goods and technology that Iran could use to acquire long-range
missiles and unconventional weapons.
Both the House and Senate foreign relations committees on April
1 received from the administration copies of a classified 30-page
report that describes such trade and names the entities being
penalized, Congressional officials confirmed, the NY Times
said.
In
his testimony on March 30, Bolton was grilled by congressmen from
both the sides. The Committee was chaired by Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL).
The subject of testimony was: The Bush administration and
nonproliferation: A new strategy emerges.
Following are the important exchanges between the
committee members and Mr. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for
Arms Control and International Security, US Department of State:
Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL): Much attention has been
focused on the revelations of the stunningly extensive nature
of the trafficking in nuclear technology and materials by members
of Pakistan's nuclear programs. These revelations, combined with
invaluable information from Libya's program, have torn the cover
from the international black market in nuclear technology and
know-how, which, prior to this inside information, had been only
sketchily understood.
What's usually overlooked, however, is the administration's success
in persuading the leaders of Pakistan to take active measures
to interrupt the proliferation of nuclear materials and assistance
that has metastasized unchecked from that country for many years.
We're now in the process of unraveling that network and preventing
the horrors its commerce would otherwise bring into being.
Rep.
Tom Lantos (D-CA): Libya's decision to give up its nuclear
weapons development program has made an unprecedented contribution
to the security of the Middle East and North Africa, and to a
broader region. The potentially destabilizing presence of nuclear
weapons in Libya is no longer a threat. But perhaps more importantly,
the documents and materials turned over by Tripoli to the United
States brought to light the shadowy truth behind the massive international
nuclear black market. Using this evidence, we were finally able
to prove that Pakistan was the key player in the international
nuclear trade. Using this black market, the leadership of Iran,
North Korea and other rogue regimes aggressively pursued their
nuclear ambitions at the expense of international stability and
American national security.
Rep.
Gary Ackerman (D-NY): I'm truly astonished by Secretary
Powell's announcement two weeks ago that the president would designate
Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally. I've always recognized Pakistan's
support for us in the war on terror; realize that President Musharraf
has taken great risks to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban. But I
think that the consistent waiver of our democracy-related sanctions
against Pakistan and the provision of over $2 billion in assistance
in the last two years, plus the president's request for another
$700 million to Pakistan for Fiscal Year 2005, clearly already
demonstrates our great support.
What
is truly amazing is that, in addition to giving Pakistan a pass
on democratic development, the administration is also giving them
a pass on proliferating nuclear technology. It is clear to me,
and I think it should be clear to anyone else, that Pakistan sold
nuclear technology and probably nuclear weapons designs to terrorist
states, even those in the evil axis.
Is
it not the administration's view that one of the gravest threats
to our national security is that terrorist organizations will
acquire weapons of mass destruction to use against us? And wouldn't
one of the chief sources of such technology be by state sponsors
of terror? Isn't this why we went to war in Iraq?
But
not a word of condemnation has passed our collective lips when
it comes to Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities. And instead
of getting to the bottom of AQ Khan's nefarious enterprise,
the president proposes to make it easier for Pakistan to acquire
sensitive US technology. Hasn't Pakistan already demonstrated
that they can't control their own technology, let alone ours?
This
double standard with regard to Pakistan makes a mockery of our
non-proliferation efforts around the world.
Mr.
Chairman, I've introduced legislation that would change the way
the president can designate major non-NATO allies by requiring
that he certify that the designee is a democracy, and that the
country participates with the United States in specified international
agreements or arrangements that restrict the export of chemical,
biological, nuclear and other weapons, delivery systems and related
dual-use components. And I would urge our colleagues to take a
look and see if they'd be willing to co-sponsor that bill.
I
do have a series of questions, and I'll wait for the appropriate
time and look forward to hearing from Secretary Bolton, who is
to be praised for his exemplary public service.
Rep. Ackerman: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, has the president made a determination of whether
or not the Symington or Glenn sanctions under the Arms Export
Control Act apply for the government of Pakistan generally, whether
it applies to specific officials of the government of Pakistan,
or entities in Pakistan?
Mr. Bolton: In connection with what transactions,
congressman?
Rep. Ackerman: With AQ Khan.
Mr.
Bolton: The decision about the policies the government
of Pakistan is pursuing on AQ Khan is one that we have been considering
very carefully, and I would say, Mr. Ackerman, to go back to your
opening statement, this turns on a fundamental evaluation as to
who in Pakistan was responsible for AQ Khan's activities. Based
on the information we have now, we believe that the proliferation
activities that Mr. Khan confessed to recently -- his activities
in Libya, in Iran and North Korea, and perhaps elsewhere -- were
activities that he was carrying on without the approval of the
top levels of the government of Pakistan. That is the position
that President Musharraf has taken, and we have no evidence to
the contrary. I don't --
Rep. Ackerman: Mr. Secretary --
Mr. Bolton: I don't -- maybe I can just finish,
because I think it's important to have the factual record out
here as we know it. I don't have any doubt that there were officials
in the employ of the government of Pakistan -- perhaps at Khan
Research Laboratories, perhaps in the military -- who participated
in Khan's network and probably enriched themselves just as Khan
himself did. But the issue is the extent to which, if at all,
the top levels of the government of Pakistan were involved in
his activities. And, as I say, we have no evidence to that effect.
And that is why, if I may say so, Khan's activities are more frightening
than if they had been backed by the government, because it shows
that independent of state sponsorship or approval, element of
this black market in weapons of mass destruction can nonetheless
be extraordinarily successful.
Rep. Ackerman: Well, I thank you for answering
your question. I'll repeat my question. But, in response to your
answer, I would just like to say you question whether or not government
officials in Pakistan were complicit in the actions of AQ Khan
or the laboratory. It seems to even the most casual -- or should
-- most casual of observers that you cannot use the military transport
plans of Pakistan to deliver that kind of materiel and program
to North Korea and others without the implicit support of the
army of Pakistan. And it seems to me that we know the name of
the guy who was the head of the army of Pakistan then.
I can understand the reluctance in this issue, which, you know,
we're damned if we do and damned if we don't. We want to make
sure that we have a government and an administration in Pakistan
which is supportive of us and our efforts against terrorists and
terrorism, and we do right now, in now President Musharraf, and
we don't want to do anything that destabilizes him.
On the other hand, it seems to me that the good work which the
chairman appropriately cites, and you have reiterated, and I have
previously called the whipping boy theory -- you grab Iraq by
the collar and go "whack, whack, whack," and turn to
some other regimes and say, "Let that be a lesson to you."
And Libya has fallen into the camp of "Oops, we don't want
to go through that." But the good work that that has produced,
seems to me, gets completely wiped out by saying we will turn
a blind eye to anybody who has or does these kinds of things and
supplies this -- this program, weapons, to rogue states or nations.
My question --
Mr. Bolton: Well, that might be the case --
Rep. Ackerman: -- let me just -- let me just
repeat my question, in case you missed it, the question was, has
the president made a determination of whether Symington or Glenn,
applied to Pakistan in general, officials or entities thereof?
Mr. Bolton: At -- with respect to the Khan transactions,
the answer to that is no. And at this point, the evidence is not
there to support it. You know, you have to --
Rep. Ackerman: When can we expect --
Mr. Bolton: You have --
Rep. Ackerman: -- that such a determination to
be made?
Mr. Bolton: Well, we are continuing to seek information
about exactly what Khan's activities were over time --
Rep.
Ackerman: Do you think that -- do you think that the
--
Mr. Bolton: -- because it's extremely important
--
Rep. Ackerman: -- designation of Pakistan as
a major non-NATO ally should wait until we've made that determination?
Mr. Bolton: No, because I think that determination
was based on other factors. I mean, we have been saying to the
Pakistanis for quite some time that --
Rep. Ackerman: So, let me just --
Mr. Bolton: Can I finish my answer this time?
We believe --
Rep. Ackerman: Yeah, but try my question.
Mr. Bolton: Okay. I did answer your question.
We believe that it's very important in the case of Pakistan or
others to act on the basis of what we know to be the case. You
can make assumptions about the use of military aircraft in Pakistan.
Those assumptions at some point have to be grounded in facts.
And the understanding we have is that Khan research laboratories
had extraordinary autonomy and quite likely could use military
aircraft for purposes that others in the military would not necessarily
know the purpose of because of compartmentation of the information
-- (inaudible) --
Mr.
Bolton: If we had information about complicity of top
levels of the government of Pakistan, we would act on it. At this
point, there's no such information.
Rep.
Ackerman: So, with charges out there, with allegations
made, with the international community watching this very carefully,
with those who we want to put on notice that we will not tolerate
nuclear programs, with the verdict and the jury still out on whether
or not Pakistan and entities thereof were complicit in this, and
prior to our knowledge, as you say, of all of the facts being
on the table as yet as to whether or not we are going to impose
sanctions on Pakistan, under either Symington or Glenn, the president
nonetheless should declare them a major non-NATO ally absent the
facts?
Mr.
Bolton: I think -- I think it's entirely appropriate
to declare Pakistan a major non-NATO ally for reasons unrelated
to this issue. And I just want to say this one more time -- and
I can't say anything more in an open session -- we have watched
the Khan network carefully. It has not escaped us that Khan is
a Pakistani, and we have watched his actions inside Pakistan carefully
as well. We have no information that contradicts what President
Musharraf has assured us, and that is that the top levels of the
government of Pakistan are not implicated in these transactions.
Now, one of the things that President Musharraf made clear was
that his pardon of Khan was conditional. It was conditional on
two things. First, that all of Khan's proliferation activities
stop. And second, that he cooperate fully with the government
of Pakistan in its ongoing investigation. We believe those conditions
are currently being met.
Rep.
Delahunt: And I think some of the questions that have
been posed regarding our awareness of what Mr. Khan was doing
haven't been really fully answered. You indicated in earlier testimony
today that there was no evidence to indicate that Mr. Khan had
any involvement with top officials of the Pakistani government.
Is that correct?
Mr.
Bolton: No, what I said was that there is no evidence
that the top officials of the Pakistani government were complicit
in or approved his proliferation activities.
Rep.
Delahunt: Complicit in or approved. Then what are we
-- let me use the word "aware." Would you also include
in that statement that they were unaware of those activities?
Rep.
Rohrabacher: All right. And what about in Pakistan? During
the last administration, we now find that during the entire time
of the last administration, Pakistan was deeply involved in developing
its nuclear weapons, and although they administration did -- the
last administration, you know, did actually take some steps, but
then Pakistan then began -- became a proliferator rather than
just a developer during the last administration. So, in Libya,
in Korea, in Pakistan during the last administration -- and, I
might add, if you look back I think you'll see the same is true
for Iran -- in all of these situations, when comparing this administration
to the perfect administration, it doesn't look too good, but when
you compare it to the last administration, I think we get about
an A-plus-plus.
